The Minneapolis Fed publishes a magazine called the Region that has consistently excellent interviews with leading economists. The June 2011 issue has an interview with Ricardo Caballero, who is chairman of the MIT economics department. To avoid making this post of encyclopedic length, I'm going to break it into three parts: Caballero on the demand for safe assets in the financial crisis, on moral hazard concerns during a financial crisis, and on how to do macroeconomics these days. But the excerpts in these three posts just scratch the surface of the interview, and the whole thing is worth reading. 
Here's Caballero on what he sees as the underlying root of the financial crisis: a global shortage of financial assets, and especially highly-rated fixed income assets. In describing the financial crises, he says:
"It’s a story in two steps. The first, present at least since  the Asian  crisis, is that the world has experienced a shortage of assets to  store  value. Emerging and commodity-producing economies have added an  enormous  demand for assets that is not being met by their limited  ability to produce  these assets. I believe this global asset shortage  is one of the main forces  behind the so-called global imbalances, the  low equilibrium real interest rates  that preceded the crisis, and the  recurrent emergence of bubbles. Contrary to  the conventional wisdom, I  think these phenomena are not the result of loose  monetary policy, but  rather the other way around: Monetary policy is loose  because an asset  shortage environment would otherwise trigger strong  deflationary  forces. ...
"This  is the second step, which began in earnest after the Nasdaq  crash, when foreign  demand for U.S. assets went back to its historical  pattern of being heavily  concentrated on fixed income ... and  especially on highly rated instruments. ...The enormous demand for U.S. assets, with a heavy bias  toward “AAA”  instruments, could not be satisfied  by U.S. Treasuries and single-name  corporate bonds, and that imbalance  generated huge incentives for the  U.S. financial system to produce more “AAA” assets. As a result, we saw both the good and the bad sides of the  most  dynamic financial system in the world, in full force. Subprime loans   became inputs into financial vehicles, which by the law of large numbers and by the principles of tranching were able to create "AAA" instruments from those that were not. ...
"Unfortunately, by construction, AAA tranches  generated from  lower-quality assets are fragile with respect to macroeconomic  and  systemic shocks, when the law of large numbers doesn’t work.  That is,  this way of creating safe assets may be able to create micro-AAA  assets but not macro-AAA  assets. In other words, these assets were not very  resilient to  macroeconomic shocks, even though they might have technically met  AAA  risk standards. ...
"In principle, this was not a big issue, but it became a huge  one  when highly leveraged systemically important institutions began to keep   these macro-fragile instruments in their balance sheets (directly, or   indirectly through special-purpose vehicles, or SPVs This was an  accident  waiting to happen; AIG and the investment banks should have  known better, but  the low capital charges were too hard to resist."
 
