Monday, March 13, 2017

Differing Productivity Across US Industries

I like to point out that a nation's economy is very different than a nation's Olympic team. With the Olympic team, a relatively small number of extraordinary athletes can make a country look good, even if the rest of us are snoozing on the sofa while watching on television. But in the national economy, having a few extraordinary companies or workers isn't enough. For a nation's economy everyone counts. If substantial groups of people are not gaining the skills and experience to work up to their capabilities, the economy as a whole suffers. If a substantial number of industries are not seeing an ongoing increase in productivity, then productivity at the national level will suffer.

The rise in productivity has been quite different across US industries in the last couple of decades, as
Matthew Russell points out in "Economic productivity in the air transportation industry: multifactor and labor productivity trends, 1990–2014," published in the Monthly Labor Review (March 2017). As the title implies, a main focus is on productivity in air transportation, but this story is set in a broader context. 

Pause a moment and make a guess: What are a few US industries that you would expect to have the highest productivity growth from 1997-2014? Lowest productivity growth. Here's the list from Russell of US industries by annual growth rate of productivity during that time: 

At the top of the list, it's no surprise that "Computer and electronic products" lead the way, given teh pace of innovation in that industry. But at least to me, seeing "Air transportation" as the second industry on the list is a surprise. At the bottom of the list, the surprise for me is that 19 industries averaged negative productivity growth over this 17-year period--not just slow productivity growth, but actually negative. Last week I wrote about one of those industries in "Sagging Productivity in Construction" (March 6, 2017). 

Sure, there are lots of tricky measurement issues here in looking at the quantity of output, and making appropriate adjustments for quality. But even with that taken into account, the range of average annual productivity values from positive to negative is still quite striking. 

(For those who need a quick brush-up, "labor productivity" is calculated as the output of an industry divided by the number of labor hours used as an input in production. What is shown in this table is "multifactor productivity." As Russell explains: "Multifactor productivity is defined as an index of real output divided by an index consisting of the following real combined inputs: capital (K), labor (L), energy (E), materials (M), and services (S). Multifactor productivity provides a more complete accounting of industry and productivity growth than does either labor productivity or any other single-factor productivity approach.")

What happened in the airline passenger industry? Here's a pattern of labor productivity in that industry since 1990, compared with the overall US business sector. Clearly, something happens to jolt productivity in this industry around 2002. 
Russell goes through the experience of the US airline industry over this time period in some detail. For this industry, output is measured by passenger-miles and by ton-miles for freight. Here are some nuggets about what drove the rise in productivity in the late 1990s and early 2000s (footnotes omitted). 
"American Airlines and United entered the Internet selling business through online companies in 1998 and quickly accounted for major ticket sales that saved the carriers millions of dollars through reduced passenger commissions. In 1998, some airlines began paying a flat $10 commission on tickets booked online and ceased payment as a percentage of the ticket fare charged. The move saved the airlines money and drove down real expenditures of purchased services throughout the industry. Other airlines chose to cut commissions paid to online ticket agents from 8 percent to 4 percent during the 1997–2000 period. As a result, passenger commissions fell by 34.2 percent, illustrating the great impact that direct Internet sales and passenger-enabled purchasing had on reducing commissions during the late 1990s. ...
"Real services declined by 10.8 percent over the 2000–02 timeframe as commissions on passenger airfare continued to decline substantially because of the drop in the number of passengers as well as the continued rise in Internet ticket purchasing. Commissions on passenger tickets fell by 39 percent, contributing the most to the average annual 8.2-percent downturn in combined inputs experienced from 2000 to 2002. Real-energy expenses declined by 18.1 percent, averaged annually, in 2000–02 as carriers quickly retired fuel-inefficient aircraft and switched to fuel-efficient aircraft as the price of jet fuel began a steep ascent in 2000. ... 
"The period from 2002 to 2007 saw the largest labor productivity gains in the air transportation industry over the 1990–2014 timeframe examined in this article. The increase was an average annual 9.8 percent, driven by strong output growth of 5.2 percent and falling labor input, at a rate of 4.8 percent. Labor input among legacy carriers fell as the carriers shifted their production model to meet the low-cost carrier competition’s business model. 
"Roughly three-quarters of the strong output gains in the 2002–07 period were attained through the use of narrow-bodied, single-aisle aircraft accommodating at least 60 passengers, and roughly 80 percent of the growth in output was attributable to the low-cost carriers. In particular, Southwest Airlines, which flies only one type of aircraft, a Boeing 737 single-aisle airplane, recorded an average annual 9.3-percent increase in revenue passenger miles, a percentage that led the low-cost carriers’ contributions to the overall 5.2-percent output growth.
"Declines in airline transportation employment during this period, led primarily by the legacy carriers, contributed to the sharp average annual decline of 4.8 percent in labor input. Throughout the mid-2000s, several airlines declared bankruptcy in order to restructure their debt and renegotiate labor contracts with unions. US Airways, United, Northwest, and Delta all initiated bankruptcy proceedings during the 2002–05 period and immediately sought ways to reduce their labor costs. The establishment of low-cost carriers with reduced labor costs forced the legacy air carriers to find ways to match the low-cost carriers’ savings ...  Also, labor unions made major concessions. For example, in 2003, the pilots, mechanics, ground crew, and flight attendants of American Airlines gave back nearly $2 billion in wages to the carrier in an attempt to help avoid bankruptcy. In addition to these wage concessions from the various labor unions were productivity concessions on the part of American Airlines workers that would reduce the carrier’s workforce by 2,000 to 3,000 workers.  ... In 2005, to boost productivity, Delta made major scheduling changes at its Atlanta hub. Such changes had been initiated earlier by American Airlines. The objective was to spread arrivals and departures more evenly throughout the day, limit congestion, and increase productivity. In another move, Frontier pilots agreed in 2004 to shift from a salaried pay system to an hourly pay system as a way for the company to increase pilots’ productivity by incentivizing them to fly more."
As usual, one's perspective on the productivity gains in air transportation will tend to depend on whether one is mainly a purchase of airline tickets, or whether one works for an airline. But it's useful to remember that this upheaval and job losses in US airlines was unrelated to international trade. Like most of the disruption and corporate distress that occurs in the enormous US domestic market, it was about disruptions from technology interacting with competitive struggles between US producers--with consumers benefiting from the result.

Saturday, March 11, 2017

Benjamin Franklin on the Origins of Daylight Savings Time

Daylight savings time starts this weekend.

The idea that adjusting the time of day can result in energy savings traces back to a whimsical essay written by Benjamin Franklin back in 1784. Franklin claims in the essay that while living in Paris and attending parties every night, he is habitually going to bed "three or four hours after midnight," and rising at noon. However, he is astonished to find one morning that the sun is rising and casting light at 6:00 am. He claims as his own personal discovery that while the ancients knew when the sun rose--after all, the time is in the almanac!--they did not know that the sun "gave light as soon as he rose. This is what I claim as my discovery. If the ancients knew it, it might have been long since forgotten; for it certainly was unknown to the moderns, at least to the Parisians ..." Franklin suggests that if everyone rose with the sun and went to bed with the sun during the summertime, there would be a vast savings of candle wax. The saved candle-wax could then be used during the shorter days of winter.

For the economists among us, there is a charm in how Franklin jibes at the "lovers of economy," and writes in what seems to me a jesting fashion: "I was pleased to see this general concern for economy, for I love economy exceedingly." Here's Franklin's letter:

To THE AUTHORS of
The Journal of Paris
1784
MESSIEURS,
You often entertain us with accounts of new discoveries. Permit me to communicate to the public, through your paper, one that has lately been made by myself, and which I conceive may be of great utility.
I was the other evening in a grand company, where the new lamp of Messrs. Quinquet and Lange was introduced, and much admired for its splendour; but a general inquiry was made, whether the oil it consumed was not in proportion to the light it afforded, in which case there would be no saving in the use of it. No one present could satisfy us in that point, which all agreed ought to be known, it being a very desirable thing to lessen, if possible, the expense of lighting our apartments, when every other article of family expense was so much augmented.
I was pleased to see this general concern for economy, for I love economy exceedingly.
I went home, and to bed, three or four hours after midnight, with my head full of the subject. An accidental sudden noise waked me about six in the morning, when I was surprised to find my room filled with light; and I imagined at first, that a number of those lamps had been brought into it; but, rubbing my eyes, I perceived the light came in at the windows. I got up and looked out to see what might be the occasion of it, when I saw the sun just rising above the horizon, from whence he poured his rays plentifully into my chamber, my domestic having negligently omitted, the preceding evening, to close the shutters.
I looked at my watch, which goes very well, and found that it was but six o'clock; and still thinking it something extraordinary that the sun should rise so early, I looked into the almanac, where I found it to be the hour given for his rising on that day. I looked forward, too, and found he was to rise still earlier every day till towards the end of June; and that at no time in the year he retarded his rising so long as till eight o'clock. Your readers, who with me have never seen any signs of sunshine before noon, and seldom regard the astronomical part of the almanac, will be as much astonished as I was, when they hear of his rising so early; and especially when I assure them, that he gives light as soon as he rises. I am convinced of this. I am certain of my fact. One cannot be more certain of any fact. I saw it with my own eyes. And, having repeated this observation the three following mornings, I found always precisely the same result.
Yet it so happens, that when I speak of this discovery to others, I can easily perceive by their countenances, though they forbear expressing it in words, that they do not quite believe me. One, indeed, who is a learned natural philosopher, has assured me that I must certainly be mistaken as to the circumstance of the light coming into my room; for it being well known, as he says, that there could be no light abroad at that hour, it follows that none could enter from without; and that of consequence, my windows being accidentally left open, instead of letting in the light, had only served to let out the darkness; and he used many ingenious arguments to show me how I might, by that means, have been deceived. I owned that he puzzled me a little, but he did not satisfy me; and the subsequent observations I made, as above mentioned, confirmed me in my first opinion.
This event has given rise in my mind to several serious and important reflections. I considered that, if I had not been awakened so early in the morning, I should have slept six hours longer by the light of the sun, and in exchange have lived six hours the following night by candle-light; and, the latter being a much more expensive light than the former, my love of economy induced me to muster up what little arithmetic I was master of, and to make some calculations, which I shall give you, after observing that utility is, in my opinion the test of value in matters of invention, and that a discovery which can be applied to no use, or is not good for something, is good for nothing.
I took for the basis of my calculation the supposition that there are one hundred thousand families in Paris, and that these families consume in the night half a pound of bougies, or candles, per hour. I think this is a moderate allowance, taking one family with another; for though I believe some consume less, I know that many consume a great deal more. Then estimating seven hours per day as the medium quantity between the time of the sun's rising and ours, he rising during the six following months from six to eight hours before noon, and there being seven hours of course per night in which we burn candles, the account will stand thus;--
In the six months between the 20th of March and the 20th of September, there are
Nights 183
Hours of each night in which we burn candles 7
Multiplication gives for the total number of hours 1,281
These 1,281 hours multiplied by 100,000, the number of inhabitants, give 128,100,000
One hundred twenty-eight millions and one hundred thousand hours, spent at Paris by candle-light, which, at half a pound of wax and tallow per hour, gives the weight of 64,050,000
Sixty-four millions and fifty thousand of pounds, which, estimating the whole at-the medium price of thirty sols the pound, makes the sum of ninety-six millions and seventy-five thousand livres tournois 96,075,000

An immense sum! that the city of Paris might save every year, by the economy of using sunshine instead of candles. If it should be said, that people are apt to be obstinately attached to old customs, and that it will be difficult to induce them to rise before noon, consequently my discovery can be of little use; I answer, Nil desperandum. I believe all who have common sense, as soon as they have learnt from this paper that it is daylight when the sun rises, will contrive to rise with him; and, to compel the rest, I would propose the following regulations; First. Let a tax be laid of a louis per window, on every window that is provided with shutters to keep out the light of the sun.
Second. Let the same salutary operation of police be made use of, to prevent our burning candles, that inclined us last winter to be more economical in burning wood; that is, let guards be placed in the shops of the wax and tallow chandlers, and no family be permitted to be supplied with more than one pound of candles per week.
Third. Let guards also be posted to stop all the coaches, &c. that would pass the streets after sunset, except those of physicians, surgeons, and midwives.
Fourth. Every morning, as soon as the sun rises, let all the bells in every church be set ringing; and if that is not sufficient?, let cannon be fired in every street, to wake the sluggards effectually, and make them open their eyes to see their true interest.
All the difficulty will be in the first two or three days; after which the reformation will be as natural and easy as the present irregularity; for, ce n'est que le premier pas qui coƻte. Oblige a man to rise at four in the morning, and it is more than probable he will go willingly to bed at eight in the evening; and, having had eight hours sleep, he will rise more willingly at four in the morning following. But this sum of ninety-six millions and seventy-five thousand livres is not the whole of what may be saved by my economical project. You may observe, that I have calculated upon only one half of the year, and much may be saved in the other, though the days are shorter. Besides, the immense stock of wax and tallow left unconsumed during the summer, will probably make candles much cheaper for the ensuing winter, and continue them cheaper as long as the proposed reformation shall be supported.
For the great benefit of this discovery, thus freely communicated and bestowed by me on the public, I demand neither place, pension, exclusive privilege, nor any other reward whatever. I expect only to have the honour of it. And yet I know there are little, envious minds, who will, as usual, deny me this and say, that my invention was known to the ancients, and perhaps they may bring passages out of the old books in proof of it. I will not dispute with these people, that the ancients knew not the sun would rise at certain hours; they possibly had, as we have, almanacs that predicted it; but it does not follow thence, that they knew he gave light as soon as he rose. This is what I claim as my discovery. If the ancients knew it, it might have been long since forgotten; for it certainly was unknown to the moderns, at least to the Parisians, which to prove, I need use but one plain simple argument. They are as well instructed judicious, and prudent a people as exist anywhere in the world all professing, like myself, to be lovers of economy; and,from the many heavy taxes required from them by the necessitities of the state, have surely an abundant reason to be economical. I say it is impossible that so sensible a people, under such circumstances, should have lived so long by the smoky, unwholesome, and enormously expensive light of candles, if they had really known, that they might have had as much pure light of the sun for nothing. I am, &c.

A SUBSCRIBER
P.S. The concept of Daylight Savings Time is sometimes attributed to George Hudson, a New Zealand etymologist, who proposed the concept in an 1895 meeting, as reported in the Transactions and Proceedings of the Royal Society of New Zealand 1868-1961, and  then followed up with a fuller discussion in an 1898 paper in the same publication outlet.  Franklin's earlier discussion was already known at the time; for example, a critical discussant in the 1895 meeting "said that the only practical part of Mr. Hudson's paper had long since been anticipated by Benjamin Franklin." However, Hudson certainly deserves credit for working out details in a more systematic way than Franklin's more whimsical letter.

P.P.S. For those not yet sated on this subject, here's a post from last year on "The Economics of Daylight Savings Time" (March 31, 2016).




Friday, March 10, 2017

Secular Stagnation vs. Financial Cycle Drag

With rates of unemployment and inflation at low levels by historical standards, the central issue for the US economy is slow growth in productivity and the overall economy.  Claudio Borio looks at two of the main hypotheses for the slowdown in "Secular stagnation or financial cycle drag?" which was given as a lecture last week at the National Association for Business Economics annual meeting held in Washington, DC.

Borio is head of the Monetary and Economic Department at the Bank of International Settlements. In turn, BIS was set up in 1930 and its membership is made up of 60 central banks from all over the world. BIS acts as a bank for central banks in certain international financial transactions, and also holds meetings and does research to encourage communication between central banks. Under Borio's leadership, the BIS has been a strong voice expressing concerns over financial cycle and their deleterious effects, so no one who knows the BIS research output will be surprised that he finds financial cycle drag, rather than secular stagnation, the more plausible explanation for slow growth. Here's how he lays out the argument (for readability, citations, footnotes, and references to graphs are omitted):

The secular stagnation hypothesis can be summarised in three propositions. First, the world has been haunted for a very long time, well before the crisis, by a structural aggregate demand deficiency that is likely to persist well into the future and keep growth sluggish. Many factors are typically mentioned in this context, including ageing populations, growing income and wealth inequality, and falling tangible investment owing to technological change. Second, the pre-crisis financial boom (or “bubble”) was the only reason why output reached potential, ie full employment. Third, and more technically, the natural (or equilibrium) real interest rate has been falling steadily and has been negative for some time. Now, the natural or equilibrium interest rate is typically defined as the rate that would prevail if output was at its potential level and hence inflation was stable. So, in plainer language, given the major structural demand deficiency, real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates must be negative in order to ensure that the economy operates at full employment and to avoid a costly deflationary spiral. Such a spiral would arise because, with nominal interest rates stuck at the zero lower bound, falling prices would raise real interest rates, which would cut spending further, which, in turn, would depress output and employment and hence prices, and so on. 
The financial cycle drag hypothesis can also be summarised in three propositions – largely the mirror image of the previous ones. First, the world has been haunted by the inability to restrain financial booms that, once they turn to bust, cause huge and long-lasting economic damage – deep and protracted recessions, weak and drawn-out recoveries, and persistently slower productivity growth. Such outsize financial cycles are best characterised by the joint fluctuations in credit and asset prices, especially property prices, as risk-taking ebbs and flows. And they tend to be much longer than “traditional” business cycles (say, 15–20 years rather than 8–10). Second, the pre-crisis boom actually pushed output above potential and undermined productivity. In other words, it was not even required to achieve full employment. Third, the natural or equilibrium real interest rate is positive and considerably higher than the secular stagnation hypothesis would suggest. There are two related reasons for this. Defining and measuring an equilibrium rate without explicitly considering the build-up of financial imbalances is too narrow an approach. In addition, the global demand deficiency has been overestimated while the role of primarily positive, and benign, secular supply side global factors in driving inflation has been underestimated. ...
The [secular stagnation] hypothesis is quite compelling in some respects, but even a cursory look at the facts raises some questions. The hypothesis was originally developed for the Unites States, a country that posted a large current account deficit even pre-crisis – hardly a symptom of domestic demand deficiency. True, US growth pre-crisis was not spectacular, but it was not weak either – recall how people hailed the Great Moderation, an era of outstanding performance. Likewise, the world as a whole saw record growth rates and low unemployment rates – again, hardly a symptom of global demand deficiency. Finally, recent declines in unemployment rates to historical averages – and, in some cases, such as the United States, close to estimates of full employment – point to supply, rather than demand, constraints on growth. 
At the same time, a number of specific pieces of evidence support the financial cycle drag hypothesis. First, there is plenty of evidence that banking crises, which occur during financial busts, cause very long-lasting damage to the economy. They result in permanent output losses, so that output may regain its pre-crisis long-term growth trend but evolves along a lower path. There is also evidence that recoveries are slower and more protracted. And in some cases, growth itself may also be seriously damaged for a long time. If so, given the GFC’s almost unprecedented depth and breadth, the subsequent evolution of output is not that surprising – although it would have been so for forecasters that did not adjust their “models” to take such patterns into account. 
Second, BIS research has found evidence that financial (credit) booms tend to undermine productivity growth, further helping to explain the post-crisis weakness ... Drawing on a sample of over 40 countries and over 40 years, the data suggest that this happens mainly as a result of a misallocation of resources towards lower-productivity growth sectors, notably construction, and that the impact of the misallocations that occur during the boom is twice as large in the wake of a subsequent banking crisis. The reasons are unclear, but may reflect, at least in part, the fact that overindebtedness and a broken banking system make it harder to reallocate resources away from bloated sectors during the bust. ...  The findings could help explain the faster pace of the long-term decline in productivity growth seen in recent years. 
Third, measures of output gaps used in policymaking now show that output was indeed above potential pre-crisis. ... The reason is simple: the symptom of unsustainable expansion was not rising inflation, which stayed low and stable, but the buildup of financial imbalances, in the form of unusually strong and persistent credit growth and property price increases. 
Or course, one need not make a totally black-or-white choice between the secular stagnation and the financial cycle drag hypotheses. For example, one could believe in secular stagnation, and still feel that it's pretty important to find ways to prevent financial cycles from blowing up into bubbles and crises.

Thursday, March 9, 2017

International Corporate Tax Rates: Some Comparisons

It's common to think of the US as the rip-roaring home of market capitalism, at least as compared to most other high-income countries round the world. But this belief sits uncomfortably with the fact that US corporate tax rates are among the highest in the world. The Congressional Budget Office has published "International Comparisons of Corporate Income Tax Rates" (March 2017). It's a short just-the-facts report, with lots of tables and figures.

Here's a graph showing top corporate tax rates across countries, with the light green dot showing the top rate in 2003 and the darker green dot showing the top rate in 2012. The US corporate tax rate is at the top of the list, and it's clear that many other countries have cut their corporate tax rates substantially since the early 2000s. 

Here's a graph showing the "effective marginal corporate tax rate," which is "a measure of a corporation’s tax burden on returns from a marginal investment (one that is expected to earn just enough, after taxes, to attract investors)." On this measure, the US is only fourth-highest among the comparison group of countries. 


Given the lower tax rates in other countries, it's perhaps not a surprise that although although the number of public companies listed on US stock exchanges has fallen by half in the last 20 years, the number of US-owned companies in a number of other countries has been rising. 

It's also probably no surprise that an increasing share of US firms are choosing to organize themselves as "S corporations," in which profits are passed through directly to the owners and taxed only through the individual income tax, thus avoiding the corporate income tax (see here and here). 

There seems to be fairly broad agreement that the US corporate income tax needs fixing. For example, here's a discussion of "Corporate Tax Reform: The Opening Obama Administration Bid" (February 3, 2015), and I offer some discussion of the destination-based cash-flow tax that House Republicans have proposed for corporate tax reform in "Border Adjustments, Tariffs, VAT, and the Corporate Income Tax" (January 31, 2017).  But the fundamental problem, it seems to me, is that a lot of American tend to think of the corporate income tax as a sort of magic money that comes from "the corporations" without any meaningful tradeoffs or costs for actual workers or producers or investors. The rest of the world is showing, by their decisions to reduce top corporate tax rates, that they perceive some of those tradeoffs. 

Wednesday, March 8, 2017

Those Rising German Trade Surpluses

For the world as as a whole, exports need to equal imports. Thus, the large US trade deficits are necessarily offset, out there in the world economy, by equally large trade surpluses in other countries. From a global perspective, these offsetting surpluses are largely in three countries: China, Germany, and Japan.

Here's are some statistics from the IMF last October showing trade balances around the world. The US trade deficits are near the top. Two lines lower, you can see the large German trade surpluses. Four lines below that are the large trade surpluses for Japan. Further down, under the category of "Emerging and Developing Asia," are the trade surpluses for China. Of these three, China had the biggest trade surplus in 2015, but Germany's trade surplus was larger in 2016 and is projected by the IMF to be much larger in 2017.
For some additional perspective on trade surpluses in these countries, here are a couple of figures using OECD data.

This figure shows trade surpluses over time from 2000 through the third quarter of 2016. (The data is quarterly, so you would need to add it up to get the annual numbers). The red line spiking high in the middle of the figure shows China's trade surpluses, which were near-zero in the early 2000s before taking off, and are now slightly below German levels. The purple line shows Japan's trade surpluses, including that intriguing moment in 2014 when Japan ran a trade deficit for a quarter. The blue line shows Germany's trade surpluses, which start off as trade deficits back around 2000 and have climbed since then.

China's economy is much larger than Germany's. So given that their trade surpluses are roughly similar in absolute size, Germany's trade surplus will be a much larger share of it
Here is the same trade data expressed as a share of GDP. Germany's trade surpluses are now up to about 8% of GDP. As a share of GDP, Japan's trade surpluses are larger than those of China.



Like a lot of economists, I think the seemingly belief that trade surpluses are a sure-fire sign of economic health while US trade deficits are a sign that the rest of the world is taking advantage of us is a signal of illiteracy in economics. I won't argue that case here, beyond noting that Japan's trade surpluses during the last quarter-century have not meant that Japan's economy was growing in a robust manner.

My sentiments are more in line with those of Adam Smith, whose 1776 classic The Wealth of Nations can in some ways be understood as an explanation of why the widespread political focus of his time on attaining trade surpluses (an economic philosophy known in its time as "mercantilism") was misguided. For example, Smith wrote (Book IV, Chapter 3):

"Nothing, however, can be more absurd than this whole doctrine of the balance of trade, upon which, not only these restraints, but almost all the other regulations of commerce are founded. When two places trade with one another, this doctrine supposes that, if the balance be even, neither of them either loses or gains; but if it leans in any degree to one side, that one of them loses and the other gains in proportion to its declension from the exact equilibrium. Both suppositions are false. A trade which is forced by means of bounties and monopolies may be and commonly is disadvantageous to the country in whose favour it is meant to be established ... But that trade which, without force or constraint, is naturally and regularly carried on between any two places is always advantageous, though not always equally so, to both." 
But if the US political system is going to have an argument over how other countries need to reduce their trade surpluses, it is at least clarifying to start with some facts.

China's trade surpluses were very large about 10 years ago, from 2006-2008, but have declined since then, and on IMF projections are already projected to drop considerably in 2017. These projections were from last October, before the US election, and thus were not based on an shift in policy by a Trump administration.

However, Germany's trade surpluses have been growing pretty steadily over time, have now outstripped China's trade surpluses both in absolute size and in share of the economy, and on IMF projections are likely to remain high in 2017.  If we're going to have a political argument in which US trade deficits are blamed on other countries, rather than on high rates of US domestic consumption and low rates of US domestic saving, we presumably should be negotiating harder with Germany than with China.

Tuesday, March 7, 2017

Global Kidney Exchange

Imagine that I need a kidney donation, and I've got a willing donor. But there's a problem: their donated kidney will not be physically compatible with me. What can be done? For Al Roth, the natural next thought is whether it's possible to find a two pairs of people who could carry out an exchange, in which my willing donor gives a kidney to you, and your willing donor gives a kidney to me. And next, you can think of multiple pairs of people, where each person who needs a kidney also brings along a willing kidney donor, and we figure out a chain of swaps where each of those who need a kidney can get one from a compatible donor.

As part of a series called "From Research to Reward," the National Academy of Sciences has produced a nice 5-minute video of this kind of kidney exchange called "The Matchmaker: An Economist Tackles Kidney Exchange." It features a couple where the husband needed a kidney and his wife was a willing donor, but her kidney was not compatible for him, so she donated to someone else and he received a donated kidney from someone else. The wife says: "This algorithm that was created by this economist, I cannot explain enough how it gives you back your life."

Now comes the idea of "global kidney exchange," put forward in "Kidney Exchange to Overcome Financial Barriers to Kidney Transplantation," American Journal of Transplantation (March 2017, pp. 782-790) by a team of authors: Michael A. Rees, Ty B. Dunn, Christian S. Kuhr, Christopher L. Marsh, Jeffrey Rogers, Susan E. Rees, Alejandra Cicero, Laurie J. Reece, Alvin E. Roth, Obi Ekwenna, David E. Fumo, Kimberly D. Krawiec, Jonathan E. Kopke, Samay Jain, Miguel Tan and Siegfredo R. Paloyo.

Basically, the notion is to involve pairs of people from low-income countries--one needing a kidney, one offering to donate a kidney--in these interlocking chains of kidney donation. For those in high-income countries, the advantage is potentially a lot more compatible kidney donors. Because getting a kidney donation saves money on dialysis, it is possible to use that saved money and provide the kidney donation for free to recipients from the low-income country. The result is healthier people, and overall cost savings. The authors explain the idea this way (footnotes omitted):

Recent worldwide estimates suggest that 2–7 million people died prematurely in 2010 because they did not have access to renal replacement therapy (RRT). In countries that provide universal citizen access to end-stage renal disease (ESRD) treatment, the cost of hemodialysis is generally more than twice the cost of renal transplantation when time horizons of >1 year are considered. This disparity provides an opportunity for payers in developed countries to pay for two kidney transplantations and still reduce their overall cost compared with keeping one of their patients on hemodialysis. ...
Organ shortage is the major limitation to kidney transplantation in the developed world. Conversely, millions of patients in the developing world with endstage renal disease die because they cannot afford renal replacement therapy—even when willing living kidney donors exist. This juxtaposition between countries with funds but no available kidneys and those with available kidneys but no funds prompts us to propose an exchange program using each nation’s unique assets. Our proposal leverages the cost savings  achieved through earlier transplantation over dialysis to fund the cost of kidney exchange between  developed-world patient–donor pairs with immunological barriers and developing-world patient–donor pairs with financial barriers. By making developed-world health care available to impoverished patients in the developing world, we replace unethical transplant tourism with global kidney exchange—a modality equally benefitting rich and poor. We report the 1-year experience of an initial Filipino pair, whose recipient was transplanted in the United States with  an American donor’s kidney at no cost to him. The Filipino donor donated to an American in the United States through a kidney exchange chain. Follow-up care and medications in the Philippines were supported by funds from the United States.
In this particular case, what seems to have happened is that the foreign donor unlocked a chain of possible other kidney donations and recipients.  The authors write:
The first GKE [global kidney exchange] was performed as a NEAD [nonsimultaneous extended altruistic donor] chain that has subsequently provided transplantations for one Filipino and 10 American ESRD patients. Six recipients had Medicare as their primary health insurance payer, and four  had commercial payers. If each of the ten health insurance payers had prospectively agreed to pay their share  of the approximately $160 000 that was provided by APD [Alliance for Paired Donation] to cover the cost of the Filipino donor and recipient’s  expenses, each payer would have paid approximately $16 000. Assuming that over the next 5 years the average savings per patient transplanted is $300 000, the reported GKE reduced the cumulative cost of health care for these payers by approximately $3 million. Critical to the scalability of GKE is recognition that if the average cost reduction is only $160 000 over 5 years (a conservative estimate), the concept is financially neutral even if performed as a simple two-way exchange.
The same issue of the journal includes a short editorial called "Financial Incompatibility and Paired Kidney Exchange: Walking a Tightrope or Blazing a Trail?" by A. C. Wiseman and J. S. Gill (pp. 597-98).  As they write, "there are numerous considerations that require equipoise ..." They point out issues that could arise in how donors in other countries are identified, whether the benefits are equitably distributed, whether consent is freely given, how this might affect providers of transplant services in low-income countries, and more. All fair enough, and I suppose only a benighted economist could bristle against their request for "sensitivity to the ethical pitfalls." I would only point out that while we are being sensitive to ethical pitfalls of global kidney exchange, 2-7 million people are dying every year without access to treatment for their kidney disease, and we should spare a little sensitivity for them, too.

Monday, March 6, 2017

Sagging Productivity in Construction

The McKinsey Global Institute reports: "Rvery year, there is about $10 trillion in construction-related spending globally, equivalent to 13 percent of GDP. This makes construction one of the largest sectors of the world economy. The sector employs 7 percent of the world’s working population ..." 

However, productivity growth in this sector has been sluggish, both in the US and around the world. Thus, a team of authors from the McKinsey Global Institute--Filipe Barbosa, Jonathan Woetzel, Jan Mischke, Maria Joao Ribeirinho, Mukund Sridhar, Matthew Parsons, Nick Bertram, and Stephanie Brown--has published "Reinventing construction through a productivity revolution" (February 2017).

As a starting point, consider this figure. Each circle represents a country, and the size of the circle shows the size of the construction industry in that country. The horizontal axis shows the annual rate of productivity growth in construction from 1995-2015 in that country. The vertical line at 0% shows that the US construction industry, along with a number of others, has experienced negative productivity growth in the last two decades. The vertical axis shows output/hour in 2015, a standard measure of productivity. It's expected that high income countries like the US will tend to be relatively high in productivity: after all, that's why they are high-income countries in the first place. The countries in yellow are the few examples of nations where labor productivity in construction exceeds labor productivity in the country as a whole.


What's going on here? Here are some summary paragraphs from the McKinsey team:
"Even while other sectors from retail to manufacturing have transformed their efficiency, boosted their productivity, and embraced  the digital age, construction appears to be stuck in a time warp. In the United States since 1945, productivity  in manufacturing, retail, and agriculture has grown by as much as 1,500 percent; productivity in construction has barely increased at all. This not only represents a lost opportunity for the industry but costs the world economy. ...
The [construction] industry is extensively regulated, very dependent on public-sector demand, and highly cyclical. Informality and sometimes corruption distort the market. Construction is highly fragmented. Contracts have mismatches in risk allocations and rewards, and often inexperienced owners and buyers find it hard to navigate an opaque marketplace. The result is poor project management and execution, insufficient skills, inadequate design processes, and underinvestment in skills development, R&D, and innovation. ... 
"Examples of innovative firms and regions suggest that acting in seven areas simultaneously couldboost productivity by 50 to 60 percent. They are: reshape regulation; rewire the contractual framework  to reshape industry dynamics; rethink design and engineering processes; improve procurement and supply-chain management; improve on-site execution; infuse digital technology, new materials, and advanced automation; and reskill the workforce. Parts of the industry could move toward a  system of  mass production, standardization, prefabrication, and modularization—a production system—that has  the potential to boost productivity by five to ten times ..."
Here's a figure showing how productivity growth in US construction lags that of other US industries. 


And here's a figure showing how global productivity growth in construction lags the average growth in labor productivity across all sectors.